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I salute the editors, staff, alumni and faculty advisors of
the American University Law Review for the performance of
distinguished service to the legal community.

Your law review

has acquired an outstanding reputation, nationally and
internationally, for the publication of articles, notes and
comments on the cutting edge of the law.

Accurate, timely, well-

researched and well-edited, the pieces published in your law
review are a tribute to the editors and staff as well as to the
authors.

I know from personal experience that those able

analyses, dynamic discussions, and comprehensive critiques by the
contributing authors would never see the light of day without the
significant student contributions essential to the publication of
each issue.
My personal experience was as a Managing Editor, a position
that I regard, naturally, as the most important on the staff.
More than 35 years have passed, but I remember my experience
well.
Editor.

I recall the lead article of my first issue as Managing
It was written by that great lion of American law,

Roscoe Pound, then Dean Emeritus of Harvard Law School.

The

article, entitled "The Judicial Process in Action," came to us in
a form all too familiar to law review staffers -- all messed up,
and with much cite and substance work required.
Process in Action"

"The Judicial

I have returned to that article time and

time again during the last 35 years -- not because it has always
remained interesting, informative and timely -- not because it
has provided me with valuable insights bearing on my work as a
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judge -- and not because it is a great classic of legal
literature.

I have returned to that article repeatedly over the

course of nearly four decades because I never have understood the
damn thing!

More about the problem of understanding law review

articles shortly.

Incidentally, there is this quote from one of

Pound's books that recently caught my attention:
stable and yet it cannot stand still."

"Law must be

I understand it but do

not consider it especially profound.
I also remember the first student note I was responsible for
editing.

The note seems strangely out of date, since it revolved

around a 1954 ruling of a Cook county, Illinois superior Court to
the effect that artificial insemination of a wife by a man other
than her husband constituted adultery and that the resulting
child was illegitimate.

The note has stuck in my mind all these

years because I remember the first line of the piece as it was
handed in.

It read:

"Artificial insemination has only lately

come into the public eye."

I immediately saw the need for some

editing on the first line.
Understandable articles Incomprehensible articles -
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Article II, Section 2 of the constitution requires that the
President of the United States nominate and, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, appoint the federal judges who
will exercise the judicial power conferred under the authority of
Article III of the Constitution.
command is all but ignored.

Today, that constitutional

The President has abdicated his duty

to nominate, the Senate provides no advice whatsoever, and the
function of senatorial consent is a mere formality in most
instances.

As regards the appointment of federal judges, the

Constitution simply is not working as the Framers intended.

That

this should be so at a time when the appointment process is in
the hands of those who profess a blind adherence to the doctrine
of original intent is strange indeed.

The difficulty of

discerning the original intent of the Framers has been expounded
upon at great length and need not be re-examined.

I do pause to

note that former Senator Eugene McCarthy recently spoke of his
support for the constitutional right of the citizenry to bear
arms, as long as the arms are of the type in use when the
Constitution was written.

so much for originalism as a general

proposition.
We know that the constitutional provision came about through

compromise.

Listen to the debates, summarized as follows in the

records of the Constitutional Convention:
Mr. L. Martin was strenuous for an appt.
by the 2d. branch [of the Natl. Legislature].
Being taken from all the states it wd. be
best informed of characters & most capable of
making a fit choice. 1
Mr. Sherman concurred in the
observations of Mr. Martin, adding that the
Judges ought to be diffused, which would be
more likely to be attended to by the [Senate]
than by the Executive. 2
Mr. Govr. Morris [spoke as follows:]
It had been said that the Executive would be
uninformed of characters. The reverse was ye
truth. The Senate will be so. They must
take the character of candidates from the
flattering pictures drawn by their friends.
The Executive in the necessary intercourse
with every part of the U.S. required by the
nature of his administration, will or may
have the best possible information. 3
Mr. Madison disliked the election of the
Judges by the Legislature or any numerous
body. Besides[] the danger of intrigue and
partiality, many of the members were not
judges of the requisite qualifications. The
Legislative talents which were very different
from those of a Judge, commonly recommended
men to the favor of Legislative Assemblies.
It was known too that the accidental
circumstances of presence and absence, of
being a member or not a member, had a very
undue influence on the appointment. on the
other hand He was not satisfied with
referring the appointment to the Executive.
He rather inclined to give it to the
Senatorial branch. 4
Doer. Franklin observed that two modes
of chusing the Judges had been mentioned, to
wit, by the Legislature and by the Executive.
He wished such other modes to be suggested as
might occur to other gentlemen; it being a
point of great moment. He would mention one
which he had understood was practiced in
Scotland. He then in a brief and
2

entertaining manner related a scotch mode, in
which the nomination proceeded from the
Lawyers, who always selected the ablest of
the profession in order to get rid of him,
and share his practice among themselves. 5
How prescient they were!

Consider this entry in the record under

the name of Mr. Ghorum:
As the Executive will be responsible in
point of character at least, for a judicious
and faithful discharge of his trust, he will
be careful to look through all the States for
proper characters. -- The Senators will be as
likely to form their attachments at the Seat
of Govt where they reside, as the Executive.
If they can not get the man of the particular
state to which they may respectively belong,
they will be indifferent to the rest. 6
Actually, Mr. Ghorum only had it half right.

Presidents also

have formed their attachments at the seat of government.

The

geographical origins of the following Supreme court nominees of
recent years are illustrative:

Burger, Scalia, Bork, Ginsburg

and Thomas from the D.C. circuit; Marshall, White and Rehnquist
from Department of Justice headquarters.

Long before there was a

Washington, D.c., and long before there was a Beltway, the
Founding Fathers warned of the myopic vision that would attend
residence at the seat of government.
What Luther Martin, that doughty Anti-Federalist said about
Senators also applies now to Congressmen and even the President:
If he has a family, he will take his family
with him to the place where the government
shall be fixed, that will become his home,
and there is every reason to expect, that his
future views and prospects will centre in the
favours and emoluments either of the general
government, or of the government of that
state where the seat of empire is
established: -- In either case, he is lost to
3

his own State. 7
It is rare indeed to find a former Member of Congress who does
not continue to reside in Washington,

o.c. in a new incarnation.

Senator warren B. Rudman of New Hampshire recently announced that
he would not be a candidate for re-election.

He indicated that

he was not inclined to return to the practice of law, although he
was sure that "the offers would be stupendous. 118

There certainly

is a great lure for those who leave off ice to remain in
Washington.

It goes by the name of wealth.

According to Senator

Rudman, there is no challenge left in serving in a government
that is "not functioning. 119

This from the man who said that his

"warmest memory 1110 of the Senate was his support for David H.
Souter for the Supreme Court.
The fact remains that a compromise was reached and that the
Senate was given a role to play in the appointment of federal
judges.

The Federalist Papers, the greatest public relations job

in the history of the Republic, confirms this notion.

The media

market gurus of today just cannot compare to the folks who wrote
the Federalist Papers, in my opinion.

Of course, the Papers were

designed to reach a literate audience, which is difficult to find
in the last decade of the twentieth century.

In Federalist No.

76, Hamilton put forth an extraordinary effort to sell the
citizenry the compromise worked out at the Constitutional
Convention.

He aimed some persuasive language at those who

preferred appointment by the Executive alone and some equally
persuasive language at those who preferred appointment by the
4

Senate alone.

He referred to the cooperative function to be

performed by the Senate in the appointment process and described
the purpose of that function in the following words:
To what purpose then require the cooperation of the senate? I answer that the
necessity of their concurrence would have a
powerful, though in general a silent
operation. It would be an excellent check
upon a spirit of favoritism in the President,
and would tend greatly to preventing the
appointment of unfit characters from State
prejudice, from family connection, from
personal attachment, or from a view to
popularity. 11
If the cooperation function of the senate is to be
performed, the constitutional imperative of Senatorial advice
must be fulfilled.

"Advice" means the same thing today as it did

when the Constitution was written.

I have a dictionary almost

175 years old, and it defines "advice" as "counsel" and
"instruction. 1112

A more modern dictionary defines advice as "an

opinion or recommendation offered as a guide to action, conduct,
etc. 1113

It seems clear to me that the Senate cannot fulfill the

advice requirement unless it has input in the nomination itself.
That has not happened for many years.

It did happen with

excellent effect when Herbert Hoover was looking for a successor
to Oliver Wendell Holmes.

Although Hoover sought a non-

controversial mid-western Republican for political reasons, heavy
advice from the Senate impelled him to name Benjamin N. Cardozo
of New York.

The nomination was made despite the fact that there

were already two New Yorkers on the bench -- Stone and Hughes,
and one Jew, Brandeis.

There is a well known story that Hoover
5

showed his list of proposed nominees, with Cardozo at the bottom,
to Senator William E. Borah of Idaho.

Borah is reported to have

said, "Your list is all right, but you handed it to me upside
down. 1114

Cardozo was easily confirmed, supported as he was by

business, labor, liberals, conservatives, academics and the
entire legal community.
Borah told Hoover:

As to the religion question, Senator

"[A]nyone who raises the question

unfit to advise you concerning so important a matter. 1115

. . is

Hoover,

of course, was the only Republican President ever to appoint a
person of the Jewish faith to the United States Supreme Court, 16
and he was not too wild about it, either.
The Cardozo appointment was a real case of merit selection.
The Framers of the Constitution really thought that merit would
(

prevail in judicial appointments.

How wrong they were!

Listen

once again to Hamilton, this time in Federalist No. 78:
[T]he records of those [legal] precedents
must unavoidably swell to a very considerable
bulk, and must demand long and laborious
study to acquire a competent knowledge of
them. Hence it is that there can be but few
men in this society, who will have sufficient
skill in the laws to qualify them for the
stations of judges. And making the proper
deductions for the ordinary depravity of
human nature, the number must be still
smaller of those who unite the requisite
integrity with the requisite knowledge. 17
Hamilton was sure that the senate would advise and consent only
on the basis of merit.

He wrote:

[I]t could hardly happen that the majority of
the senate would feel any other complacency
towards the object of an appointment, than
such, as the appearances of merit, might
inspire, and the proofs of the want of it,
6

destroy. 18
How does one define merit for purposes of federal judicial
service?

I think that Professor Henry Abraham, a great Supreme

Court scholar, had it right when he said that it could be defined
in terms of six components:

demonstrated judicial temperament;

'professional expertise and competence; absolute personal as well
as professional integrity; an able, agile, lucid mind;
appropriate professional background or training; and the ability
to communicate clearly, both orally and in writing. 19
Objective merit no longer is the lodestar of federal
judicial appointments.

It probably never was, entirely.

Even in

the beginning, when there were no political parties, the
Federalists seemed to get the nod over the Anti-Federalists.

The

Federalists still get the nod, as I shall demonstrate shortly.
Professor Abraham has identified three other bases for
presidential nominations to the supreme court:

personal

friendship; the balancing of representation or representativeness
on the court; and real political and ideological compatibility. 20
These factors, singly or in combination, have formed the basis
for judicial selection over the years in the Supreme Court and in
the lower courts as well.

To these, I would add another factor

that has surfaced in recent years

confirmability, that is, the

ability not to create too great a stir when an indolent Senate
undertakes its consent function.

Indeed, it is the ideological

factor (concealed and obfuscated to the greatest extent possible)
and the confirmability factor that have most occupied the Chief
7

Executives in recent years. 21
consigned to the back seat.

Merit has been more or less
In that connection, I think that it

can safely be said that the President's characterization of the
most recent appointee to the Supreme court as "the best person
for this position 1122 did not find unanimous acceptance in the
legal community.

It seems that the center of all activity

relating to judicial appointments at present is centered in the
office of the counsel to the President, Mr. C. Boyden Gray.~

It

is there that the hot flame of ideology burns brightly, tended by
those who consider themselves the descendants of the original
Federalists but who indeed are not.

Just as the original

Federalists dissembled in the use of their name to gain political
ascendancy, so do the Federalists of today.

The originals of

course wanted to strengthen the new nation and to build a strong
central government at the expense of the states.

However, they

adopted a name that was indicative of just the opposite.

Luther

Martin opposed ratification of the Constitution and railed
against being labelled an Anti-Federalist.

He wrote that those

who advocate the system [of national
government established in the Constitution]
pretend to call themselves federalists [but]
in convention the distinction was quite the
reverse: those who opposed the system[] were
there considered and styled the federal
party, those who advocated it, the antifederal. 24
Despite the carping of Luther Martin, those who supported the
Constitution made the label stick, and history ever will know
them as Federalists.
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Those who call themselves Federalists today are hardly of
the same order.

They are extremely conservative and see little
good in a strong central government. 25 For some reason, they do

believe in a strong Executive, but consistency is not their
strong suit.

Those who seek to maintain the modern Federalist

label are entitled to one or more liberal thoughts.
attached the label "libertarian" Federalists. 26

To them is

The modern

movement started among some law students in the 1980s.

These

students perceived a clear and present danger in the concept of
the Constitution as a living document and organized as a protest
against the liberal law professors who they accused of advocating
a too-expansive reading of the Charter and of ignoring original
intent. 27

They tended to cluster around such academics as Bork

and Scalia. 28

The force of history and attachment to the

coattails of political winners has catapulted them to positions
of power, first as law clerks, then as movers and shakers in the
office of the Attorney General and now in the office of the
President.

This has been accomplished not by acquiring political

power but by coopting it.

Lee Liberman, a founder of the new

Federalists and now Assistant Counsel to the President, examines
all candidates for federal judgeships for ideology purity.~

It

is well known that no federal judicial appointment is made
without her imprimatur.

A recent dispatch in the New York Law

Journal reports the President's nomination of a judge to my
court, the nominee being described as a litigator in a New York
City law firm and as "a director of the local chapter of the
9

Federalist Society. 11 30
And so the center of power for the appointment of federal
judges has shifted away from Presidents and Senators to staff.
In the case of district judges, Senators of the President's party
still are afforded the right in the first instance to submit the
names of proposed nominees for approval by the Presidential
staff. 31

This process should be known as nomination by a Senator

and advice and consent by the Presidential staff.

The incumbent

President is known to have no interest in the process.

In former

administrations, the Attorney General played a large role in
judicial selection.

During the regime of Attorney General

Thornburgh, one Murray Dickman, a political operative and a nonlawyer who came to Washington from Pennsylvania with his boss,
was the Attorney General's "point man" on judicial nominations. 32
Obviously, he deferred to Ms. Liberman.~

The present Attorney

General seems to be little more than a conservative adjunct of
the White House Counsel • s office. 34
While a candidate must for any federal court appointment
pass muster by the Attorney General, the American Bar Association
(which is known to cave in whenever the Administration threatens
to disregard it), the FBI and the IRS, the most important muster
point is the office of the counsel to the President.

Staff is

the key, just as staff is the key in all of government.

If one

desires response from a Congressman, a Senator, a Justice, the
Secretary of a Department or an Agency head, one must go to
staff.

It is no different in the judicial selection process.
10

It

is becoming no different in the adjudicatory process itself.
With no input from the President and no advice from the
Senate (except perhaps the right of first refusal in district
court appointments), the next step in the appointment of federal
judges is Senate confirmation.
of staff.

Again, there is the intervention

The confirmation hearings make that clear, as staffers

are seen passing notes to the Senators during the proceedings.
staffers also are known to leak confidential information received
by the Senate regarding nominees. 35 Do these hearings serve any
purpose?

In the vast majority, they do not.

The questions are

mostly pro forma in the case of district and circuit judge
confirmations.

During my confirmation hearing for the circuit

Court, Senator Thurmond asked me whether I understood that it was
the duty of a Judge to interpret the law and not make the law.
said that I did.

I

From the other side of the aisle, Senator Simon

asked if I understood that it might not always be the case that a
Judge should interpret the law and not make the law.
I understood that too.

I said that

That was about the size of my hearing,

except for a unanimous confirmation vote in Executive Session.
The Senate seems to turn its attention briefly to the
confirmation process only in the case of Supreme Court Justices.
While it is true that a number of nominees to the Supreme Court
have been rejected, the reason for rejection today would seem to
depend solely on the polls taken by the Senators and general
public reaction to the nominee.
It is interesting that no nominee for the Supreme Court made
11

a personal appearance before the Judiciary Committee until 1925,
when Harlan Fiske Stone appeared.

Despite hostile questioning,

it is said that "he came through with flying colors in a
performance marked by strength, dignity, and articulateness. 1136
Recent Supreme court nominees have shown little of these
qualities in appearances before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Of course, neither have those who asked the questions.

We are

now treated to what is in effect a staged, albeit bumbling,
performance on both sides.

The nominee, aided by public

relations experts, Justice Department briefers and those on the
other side of the table who support confirmation, try to say as
little as possible, using the old dodge:

"I may have to decide

that matter."
Robert Bork, for all his faults, including his desire to
attend an intellectual feast when he had not yet been invited to
eat, may have been the last of the straight shooters.

He

answered honestly, directly, without guile and with some
intellect, all the questions put to him.

His answers scared the

hell out of everybody, and he was not confirmed.

He accurately

predicted that direct answers would never again be the norm,
because nominees would be selected from those who have not
written or spoken about important issues. 37 Those who followed
him have studiously avoided any controversial responses to
questions put to them, in one case even ignoring what the nominee
himself had said and written previously.

The hearings have

become an exercise in futility because of the failure to ask
12

proper questions and get proper answers. 38

These public

spectacles should be eliminated unless they can be rendered
meaningful.

Perhaps counsel should do the questioning.

Perhaps

the nominees should be required to appear immediately upon
nomination without being given time to prepare evasive answers.
Perhaps it should not profit the President's staff to seek out
"trackless" nominees rather than certified intellectuals like
Bork.

Of course, intellectual distinction has no political

constituency.

Perhaps staff shouldn't be involved at all --

senatorial staff or Presidential staff.
If I were a Senator, I would not tolerate evasion or
stonewalling in answering my questions.

While a nominee may not

disclose how he or she would decide a particular case, there are
a number of questions that he or she should be required to answer
-- questions respecting an understanding of history; questions
about important prior decisions of the Court; questions designed
to elicit an understanding of the current issues confronting the
Court; questions of approach to judging, of philosophy, of
adherence to stare decisis.

I would not accept an answer that

obviously is untrue, such as one that denies having taken any
position on a controversial issue before the Court that is under
discussion by the entire nation.
I wanted, I would vote "no."

If I could not get the answers

I do not think that there is

anything out of bounds about requiring answers to questions about
financial, sexual or other misdeeds.

Because of the importance

of the federal judiciary in our nation, one who aspires to
13

membership in it must demonstrate excellence in all things.

That

excellence should be demonstrated to the personal satisfaction of
the President and the personal satisfaction of each and every
member of the senate.
Excellence!

What a wonderful and rare thing it is!

Yet, it

is the cornerstone of all human achievement and is found in every
vocation.

James Bryant Conant said:

"Each honest calling, each

walk of life, has its own elite, its own aristocracy, based on
excellence of performance. 1139

It seems to me that the ability to

recognize legal excellence is one of the most important benefits
you have gained from your legal education and from your
participation in the Law Review.

Aristotle tells us that "[w]ith

regard to excellence, it is not enough to know [it], but we must
try to have and use it. 1140

Although we all should strive to

excel, as Aristotle urges, not everyone can acquire excellence.
What everyone can and should acquire, however, is the ability to
appreciate excellence in others.

To have such an appreciation,

we must understand that people have different abilities, just as
they have different qualities and talents.
when it comes to excellence.

All are not equal

There are but a few who have that

surpassing ability to achieve exceptional performance in the law.
As lawyers, you should strive to identify and acknowledge
superior legal talent and ability and to insist, as the bar did
in that shining hour when Cardozo was appointed, that only the
best among you be selected to serve on the Supreme Court and on
the lower federal courts. 41

The process of nomination, advice
14

and consent may have broken down for now and may not be
functioning as the Framers intended, 42 but the political process
can make it work again.

That is the beauty of our system.

And

that is where you come in and where I, as a Federal Judge, cannot
go.

{

\
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